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Abstract—In this article the author makes an attempt  
to characterize the main factor – mobility – which is to be taken 
into consideration while designing the ground radar component 
(passive and active radars) of the Air Defense systems in order to 
enable them to operate on the contemporary battlefield. He 
presents the latest theoretical views on the relationship between the 
usage of anti-radiation missiles and the mobility of the passive and 
active radars as the key ability to protect them against such 
weapons. In particular the author emphasizes that the anti-
radiation missiles present nowadays the biggest threat for the 
effective Air Defense systems, which are today characterized by  
a high complexity degree. He also stresses the need to combine  
the radars, both passive and active, into one system allowing for 
the streamlining of their work parameters and thus ensuring their 
complex usage. The gaining of those capabilities shall guarantee 
that the parameters of the air surveillance radar area can be 
defined effectively. 
 
Keywords—radar, radiolocation, air defense system, survive to 
operate on the battlefield, mobility, anti-radiation missile 
I. MOBILITY 
ANEUVERABILITY (sample definitions)1 – 1. capacity  
of a vehicle or a ship, to perform a movement in terrain 
in military or naval tactics; or 2. ability of the troops to perform 
fast redeployment. In case of operating the radars, mobility 
should be understood as the ability to: 
− efficient folding of all the construction elements of the radar 
in order to be able to transport the equipment in one piece 
and to leave the combat position quickly, moving to a secure 
distance, avoiding thus destruction or damage caused  
by weapons; 
− efficient radar troops redeployment aiming at effective air 
target detection by keeping the ability to survive to operate. 
II. MAIN THREAT – ANTI-RADIATION MISSILE (ARM) 
Table I presents the simplified data concerning the velocity, 
range and flight time of the chosen anti-radiation missiles. 
Another important parameter of the anti-radiation missiles is the 
missile target accuracy and destruction range done by  
the warhead exploding – significant in the context of the radar's 
survival on the battlefield. 
In the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s the ARMs 
possessed destruction range of 15 m (AGM-45 SHRIKE),  
of 20 m (Ch-58), of 50 m (Ch-28 and Ch-28M), and even  
of 150 m (AGM-78 STANDARD-ARM). However, the missile 
target accuracy of ARMs is known and at that time amounted  
to about 15-20 m (AGM-78 STANDARD-ARM) and about 5 m 
(Ch-28, Ch-28M, Ch-58).  
At the end of 1970s and in the 1980s, the missile target accuracy 
of ARMs amounted to about 5-8 m (Ch-15P, Ch-31P2,  
Ch-58U), or to 7-9 m (AGM-88 HARM), while their destruction 
range had not changed. 
In the 1990s the missile target accuracy of ARMs did not 
undergo any significant changes and amounted to about 5-8 m 
(Ch-58E, Ch-58EM) or to 6 m (AGM-88C HARM). 
The destruction ranges of ARMs from the first decade of the  
21st century did not differ from their predecessors (being just 
another version of the basic ARMs), but the missile target 
accuracy of ARMs improved radically due to applying the GPS 
in the guidance systems (German ARMIGER, British ALARM, 
American AGM-88E AARGM) and their target accuracy is less 
than 1 meter (≤ 1 m). 
III. EXPERIENCES 
During the 1995 Balkan conflict campaign, during the, when the 
major role was played by the precision guided weapon, NATO 
planes were equipped with ARMs, too. In the NATO air 
campaign conducted by NATO code named Deliberate Force, 
the NATO forces used American Air Force ARMs of the  
AGM-88 HARM type and of the first version. Using these 
missiles was aimed at the destruction of the integrated Air 
Defense System by conducting SEAD missions (Suppression 
of Enemy Air Defenses). 
During the 1999 period of this conflict ALARM, AGM-88B 
HARM and AGM-88C HARM missiles were launched over 
Serbia and Kosovo, but they were not able to do serious damage 
to the extremely mobile Yugoslavian air-defense forces. Only 
about 115-130 of the ground targets emitting electromagnetic 
radiation were eliminated, which proves the high efficiency 
of the Yugoslavian forces’ operations, i.e. high discipline level 
concerning the limited time of radars’ radiation (up 
to 10 seconds) and the high mobility of the forces (constant 
changing the positions of the anti-aircraft weapons). 
The NATO official reports state that the efficiency of the HARM 
missiles was 3%-6.6%3, depending on the operation’s phase [7]. 
Since then, the development of weapons encompassed ARM 
too, but the experiences mentioned above prove the effective 
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IV. TIME OF OPERATING ON A RADAR PICKET 
The operating time of a radar on a radar picket should be limited 
to a minimum, like in case of the Yugoslavian conflict the time 
of the electromagnetic radiation of a radar has to be limited  
to 10 seconds. 
In battle conditions a radar’s antenna must rotate in a full circle 
(360°) at least once. In case of mid- and long-range radars 
produced in Poland, the time of scanning the full circle differs 
from 2.5 s to 10 s [11], which can be reduced only by means  
of sector operation (electromagnetic radiation). Just to be safe, 
regardless the situation development, the operating time  
of a radar transmitter on a radar picket has to be obligatorily 
limited to 10 s, which has already been checked in practice and 
confirmed during the Balkan conflict. The total time of folding4 
the radar consists of fractional phases: folding of the antenna, 
lifting the stabilizing supports, disconnecting and throwing 
away the cables along with the light pipes. 
In order to radically shorten the process of radar folding, it is 
necessary to construct each mobile radar as a single vehicle,  
as well as equip it with the following automated mechanisms: 
quick antenna folding (among others absorbing the energy  
of the quickly folding antenna), lifting the stabilizing supports 
(immediately after the antenna folding), disconnecting and 
throwing away the cables and light pipes (they are all located  
in one place as a multi-pipe “fast-junction”). Thus, it shall be 
possible to move the radar quickly away for a distance allowing 
the radar to survive, despite being hit by splinters coming from 
the explosion of an anti-radiation missile. The starting and 
driving of the radar away must be performed automatically.  
The vehicle should be equipped with electric gear wheels, while 
the electric engine should be characterized by high torque and 
started by an automatic electric signal. 
Summing up, on the basis of the available technologies, it is 
possible to reduce the time of the radar remaining on a radar 
 
 
4 At the moment, the shortest time needed for folding a radar 
produced in Poland (NUR-21, NUR-22) is 5 minutes. 
picket even to less than 60 seconds (one minute): about 10 s  
of electromagnetic radiation, about 20 s for radar folding,  
about 30 s for a drive of more or less 40 m (with the speed  
of about 5 km/h, i.e. about 1.4 m/s). 
V. MOBILITY AND THE RADAR PARAMETERS 
One of the uppermost coefficient for radars (and the mobility) 
is the general dependence existing between: range of the 
electromagnetic wavelength and power of the transmitter; and 
weight and dimensions of the radar’s antenna and weight and 
dimensions of the radar’s platform (secondary dependence – 
equation 1, fig. 1). 
WAP = f (FEM, PT)         (1) 
WAP – weight and dimensions of the radar’s antenna  
and weight and dimensions of the radar’s platform. 
FEM – range of the electromagnetic wavelength. 
PT – power of the transmitter. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Secondary dependence – range of the electromagnetic wavelength and 
power of the transmitter & weight and dimensions of the radar’s antenna and 
weight and dimensions of the radar’s platform 
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This dependence points to the fact, that in spite of increasing 
weight and dimensions of the radar’s (depending on the range 
of the electromagnetic wavelength and power  
of the transmitter), it is necessary to keep the correct values  
of the mobility coefficient for all types of radars. 
It means exactly that in the context of construction each radar 
has to possess the possibility of quick folding and changing  
the combat picket, which is the most important condition  
for the radars to survive to operate. 
 
It is commonly known that on the today’s battlefield destroying 
the object basically consists of two phases: 
− detecting – when the sensor or man transfers the information 
about the detected object to the commanding post, where  
it becomes priority and the completed information about  
the object is transferred to active combat systems with  
the order to attack it; 
− attack – when after receiving the order to attack the active 
combat systems make use of the appropriate assets, 
attacking and eventually destroying or disarming the object. 
In case when the object does not have active defense (after 
seizure of the combat picket), on the opposite side  
of the barricade functioning of every object on the today’s 
battlefield is basically divided into three phases: 
− work – when the object has to complete the mission; 
− folding – when the object does folding of all own parts and 
completely prepares to leave the combat picket; 
− movement – when the object has to conduct the movement 
at the safety distance, applying the camouflage  
and confusing the active combat assets of the enemy. 
In order to establish the possibility of estimating how to avoid 
the destruction of the attacked object, and to have the possibility 
to compare this kind of attribute between different objects, 
it is necessary to establish the coefficient, which allows for this 
kind of estimation and comparison. 
Taking into consideration the data above we can lay down  
the mathematic formula, naming it “mobility coefficient”: 
M = 
   (TD + TA)         . 
(TW + TF + TM) 
(2) 
M – mobility coefficient. 
TD – the detection time of the object by the enemy [s]. 
TA – the attack time on the object, conducted by the enemy 
[s]. 
TW – the work time of the object, attacked by the enemy  
on a picket [s]. 
TF – the folding time of the object [s]. 
TM – the movement time of the object [s]. 
Magnitude of mobility coefficient should be always equal or 
larger than magnitude one (M ≥ 1), otherwise  
the attacked object is in danger of being destroyed. 
In case of radars the mathematic formula can be used directly 
(calculated coefficient M will then have very low values), but 
because of the number of the additional peculiar factors, 
this formula has to be adapted to the conditions of functioning 
of the existing radars. 
Because of the large quantity of combat assets, with which  
the enemy can destroy the radars, it is necessary to establish the 
reference times (point of reference / frame of reference; 
benchmark) for the radars, which shall determine the theoretical 
operational requirements defined for the radars on the today’s 
battlefield. 
The theoretical operational requirements are the point  
of reference for the possibilities of the active combat assets 
dedicated to destruction of the radars. 
The new form of the mathematic formula, dedicated  
to mobility of the radars, will have the following form: 
MRR = 
   (TDR + TAR)           . 
(TWR + TFR + TMR) 
(3) 
MRR – reference mobility coefficient of the radar. 
TDR – detection time of the radar by the enemy [s]. 
TAR – time attack on the radar conducted by the enemy [s]. 
TWR – acknowledged theoretical reference time of the 
radar’s work (radiation – electromagnetic emission), 
radar attacked by enemy on a radar picket [s]. 
TFR – acknowledged theoretical reference time of the radar’s 
folding [s]. 
TMR – acknowledged theoretical reference time of the radar’s 
platform movement [s]. 
Desired magnitude of reference mobility coefficient  
of the radar (MRR) will be equal or larger than the magnitude 
one (MRR ≥ 1), and its scale is comparable with the universal 
mobility coefficient of the radar (M). 
In case when MRR < 1, the attacked radar will be in danger  
of being destroyed. 
Since most used radars were constructed many years or even 
decades ago, at the same time some of the recently and 
nowadays manufactured radars are constructed on the basis  
of a structural idea descended from the time of the “cold war”, 
an additional multiplier (assumed numerical coefficient) must 
be applied, allowing for producing the result the radar’s current 
mobility coefficient (MR), calculated as a number approximated 
to one. 
This kind of calculating (correction by multiplier) is necessary 
only for assuring better clarity of the coefficient and the 
possibility of comparing the mobility of the existing radars, 
which in most cases are exposed to being destroyed already in 
the first period of armed conflict. 
Only the next form of the mathematic formula, dedicated to the 
current mobility of the radar, provides us with the comparative 
possibility (main formula – equation 4, Table II, fig. 2)]: 
MR = 
(TWR + TFR + TMR) ∙ 102 
(TW + TF + TM) 
(4) 
MR – current mobility coefficient of the radar. 
TWR – acknowledged theoretical reference time (point  
of reference / frame of reference; benchmark)  
of the radar’s work (radiation – electromagnetic 
emission) attacked radar on a radar picket (assumed 
for now about 10 s) [s]. 
TFR – acknowledged theoretical reference time (point  
of reference / frame of reference; benchmark) of the 
radar’s folding (assumed for now about 20 s) [s]. 
TMR – acknowledged theoretical reference time (point  
of reference / frame of reference; benchmark) of the 
radar’s platform movement (assumed for now about 
30 s for a drive of more or less 40 m with the speed 




102 – multiplier5 (weighting factor), depend of the 
technology advancement and difference between: 
acknowledged theoretical reference times (point of 
reference / frame of reference; benchmark) of the  
radar’s and the real times: work, folding and 
movement of the radar’s (assumed for now 100). 
 
TW – real time of the radar’s work (radiation  
– electromagnetic emission) attacked radar on a radar 
picket) [s]. 
TF – real time of the radar’s folding of attacked radar [s]. 
TM – real time of the attacked radar’s platform movement  

















1,5 h 2 h 2,5 h 3 h 4 h 5 h 
MR 1,5 0,79 0,41 0,27 0,14 0,09 0,07 0,055 0,046 0,034 0,03 
            
  
 
Fig 2: Major dependence – time (real time of the radar’s work, folding and real 
time of the radar’s platform movement) & mobility of the radar (MR) 
Acknowledged reference times (point of reference / frame  
of reference; benchmark) are connected with the theoretical 
assumption, that on the basis of the available technologies,  
it is possible to reduce the time of the radar remaining on a radar 
picket even to less than 60 seconds (one minute): about 10 s  
of electromagnetic radiation, about 20 s for radar folding, about 
30 s for a drive of more or less 40 m (with the speed of about 
5 km/h, i.e. about 1.4 m/s). 
Theoretical reference times (point of reference / frame  
of reference; benchmark) connected with the radar’s (work, 
folding and movement) result directly from the active weapon 
systems reaction caused by the radar’s radiation, i.e. the time 
range between the detection of electromagnetic radiation until 
the moment of hitting into (the destruction of) the radar by the 
fire assets. 
On the today’s battlefield almost all the destruction systems 
work automatically, the result being the high requirements for 
the radars time of work, folding and movement. 
By applying the high-defined operational requirements for the 
radars we protect them against destruction systems, they work 




5 Acknowledged coefficient allowing for producing the result  
the radar’s current mobility coefficient (MR), calculated  
as a number approximated to one. 
 
VI. ACTIVE RADARS 
Because of the high value of an active radar (receiver, data 
processing, computer and transmitter), in order to survive, the 
radar has to be lightly armored. The armoring has to be mounted 
not only on the main parts of the radar, as it is in case of some 
existing radars (for example NUR-21, NUR-22, Pirhanna 740  
– Giraffe). Also, it has to be mounted on the sensitive 
components of antenna (radiant elements and folding 
machinery), as well as on the stabilizing supports. The antenna 
should be protected continuously during operating – the 
armoring should be as lightweight as possible and located  
at the rear side of the antenna, lifting and rotating together with 
it while operating in combat. 
Having detected an anti-radiation missile, the antenna must be 
automatically turned with its armored side towards the nearing 
missile. In the moment of explosion splinters of the missile 
exploding a few meters above the ground will hit the armor, 
leaving the antenna protected, regardless of its type.  
The antenna can be protected by means of lighter materials 
(Kevlar, composites with ceramic antiballistic layers, reactive 
armor, armors of the Chobham type6). The best solution would 
be ultimately to hide the antenna inside the armored vehicle  
so that the antenna armor itself would shield it from above. 
VII. PASSIVE RADARS 
In the case of a passive radar, where the receiver is separated 
from the transmitter, the whole part of radar with the receiver 
inside needs extremely good protection (receiver, data 
processing, computer and transmitter, etc.). In most cases, the 
present solutions of the passive radar constructions rely on 
exploitation radiation emitted from foreign transmitters, based 
mostly on these used by the enemies. Nevertheless, in this 
instance it should be expected, that an interruption in detecting 
the air objects on the ground is possible, since our troops do not 
have control about the reclosure of the enemies transmitters. 
6 Source: http://www.mt.com.pl/pociski-przeciwpancerne-i-pancerze 
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The concept of using transmitters belonging to the enemy for 
our own purposes should remain the major method of using our 
own passive radars. 
However, in order to entirely control the development  
of situation on the today’s battlefield, including the possibility 
to conduct military operations predictable to our own troops and 
to anticipate in advance movement of our troops,  
it is necessary to have own transmitters dedicated to own passive 
radars. In military use of the passive radars our troops cannot 
leave anything to chance, because one of the keys to win  
a conducted battle is to impose one's will on the opponent. 
Considering that we construct one passive radar consisting of 
two components – two distinct devices located on two separate 
platforms – it gives us enormous possibilities of influencing the 
future military tactic by means of correct construction of this 
passive radar. The receiver with others important devices (the 
best is in this case is the wire communication) can be effectively 
hidden and camouflaged, because this particular part of the 
radar does not emit any electromagnetic radiation (or just 
minimal and directional in case of using the directional radio 
communication used to transmit the collected radar data 
concerning the air objects). 
In case of the passive radar transmitter one must take into 
account that as an electromagnetic radiation active device, it is 
going to be a regular target of attacks by the enemy. Therefore, 
the transmitter has to be located on a very mobile platform and 
the whole device has to be as lightweight as possible, and have 
the ability to move efficiently in the terrain. As it was indicated 
before, the time of electromagnetic radiation has to be limited 
to minimum. 
The solution guaranteeing the long-lasting electromagnetic 
radiation useful for the work of the passive radar receiver is to 
possess a large number of mobile transmitter platforms. This 
makes it able to provide continuity of the air targets detection 
by radars. Continual movement of the mobile transmitter 
platforms in the terrain and their electromagnetic radiation 
emitted during short stops, ensures military control of the 
airspace for needs of the Air Defense system. 
VIII. “CONTINUITY OF TRACKING” AND “THE INFORMATION 
CONTINUITY” – COMPARISON 
On today’s battlefield, “continuity of tracking” the air objects 
by the active elements of the radar surveillance system is not 
possible. It results from the fact that contemporary battlefield 
(battle space) is still strongly saturated with assets  
of destruction. Such stability of tracking can be nowadays 
provided only by passive assets (e.g. Passive Coherent Locator 
– PCL), which, however, requires constant electromagnetic 
emission of some other sources of radiation. 
Radiation of the active elements of the radar surveillance system 
allowing them to survive, must be restricted to a minimum – and 
represent a compromise between the ability of “non-continuous 
tracking” of the air objects and maneuvering performed by the 
active elements. This only shall allow for keeping the ability  
to accomplish the principal task – which is detection of the air 
objects. 
Consecutive turning on the active elements of the radar 
surveillance system (the so-called “flash”) shall permit to keep 
“the information continuity” concerning the air object of the 
opponent, but it is not the same as “continuity of tracking” each 
of these objects. The first one is required only in the phase  
of fighting this object, when it is necessary to distribute the 
targets among one’s own warfare assets and to direct them 
towards the assigned targets. In case of warfare assets equipped 
with their own guidance systems it is enough just to direct them 
preliminarily in such a way allowing their guidance systems for 
interception of the allotted target. 
Therefore, during the phase of detection, observation and 
evaluation of the tactical operations of the adversary, it is 
enough to provide “the information continuity” concerning the 
opponent’s air objects. It is not equivalent with the undisturbed 
“continuity of tracking” each of the enemy’s objects, which  
– nowadays – can be provided only by passive radars, requiring, 
however, constant emission of the electromagnetic radiation 
from other sources. To guarantee such continuity, the passive 
radars must have the possibility of receiving a very wide 
spectrum of electromagnetic emission (frequency) emitted by 
all possible sources (e.g. radiolocation, radio communication, 
navigation systems etc.). Each of them must be equipped with 
broadband receiver or a proper number of devices must be 
equipped with receivers tuned to individual frequency sub-
bands. 
As a result, it is a priority to establish a proper compromise 
between the survivability of the radar surveillance system and 
its ability to keep “continuity of information” concerning the 
opponent’s air objects or of tracking them. Taking into account 
the possibilities of the modern warfare assets, like detecting and 
self-guiding towards the targets, achieving such a compromise 
is possible, requiring just proper theoretical basis. 
IX. MOBILITY OF RADARS 
According to the dependences shown on the figures, which 
result from the laws of physics and experiences concerning 
construction of the radars, the most lightweight and the most 
mobile will be the transmitters of the passive radars (or the 
complete active radars), constructed with transmitters using 
who use the shortest range of electromagnetic wavelength 
(millimeter and centimeter radio waves). Transmitters using the 
electromagnetic wavelength of longest range (decimeters and 
meters radio waves) are going to have respectively larger weight 
and dimensions. 
Therefore, because of the movement efficiency in the terrain, 
the most mobile complete active radars or the transmitters  
of passive radars should be directed towards the enemy as near 
as possible. But further away from the FLOT (Forward Line  
of Own Troops) less moveable radars can be used.  
It is confirmed by the data included in table I, which presents 
the flight time from the firing moment until reaching the target 
which emits electromagnetic radiation for every type of ARM, 
along with their ranges. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions concerning the construction of modern radars: 
− while constructing radars one must take into consideration 
all the factors, which influence their mobility; 
− in order to keep control over the continuity of the air target 
detection with usage of the passive radars, it is necessary to 




radars, located on separate and very mobile platforms; 
− because of the construction aspects, the passive radars 
provide greater potential of effective tactical usage of them 
on the today’s battlefield than the active radars; 
− due to lower mobility and higher value of the active radars 
as a whole (transmitter and receiver in one device), active 
radars should to be lightly armored; 
− passive radars do not need armor, because they have 
separated receiver and transmitter, which are used  
at different locations (the receiver and transmitter are 
mounted on two distinct platforms); 
− to reduce the time of folding the radar and leaving the 
combat position (picket) with the active radars and 
transmitters of the passive radars is the absolute necessity  
on the today’s battlefield. 
XI. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The next step to construct the modern radar reconnaissance 
subsystem meeting the needs of the Air Defense System is the 
functional combining of all radars one owns (active and passive) 
in one system, whose work is effectively controlled. In order  
to perform such a complicated function, it has already been 
recognized as necessary to construct universal radar control 
consoles (standardized), as well as to design new radars, which 
would be universal within the NATO in the context  
of standardized control. 
The most important requirements concerning a modern radar 
surveillance subsystem of Air Defense System include the 
following: 
− very high mobility of active radars and transmitters of 
passive radars; 
− the limited time of radars’ radiation on the combat position 
(picket), with short time of electromagnetically emission  
up to 10-12 seconds; 
− high survivability of the active radars, resulting, among 
others, to light armoring; 
− detecting all types of air objects; 
− supporting the tactical and operational situation analysis 
with the aid of “intelligent” software;  
− full cooperation with other surveillance and command 
systems; 
− possibility of controlling the radar from different levels 
(fully flexible operation). 
Meeting these requirements ensures the possibility to shape 
dynamically the radar surveillance zone parameters. 
XII. SUMMING-UP 
Course of last military conflicts proved that the existing radar 
surveillance systems of the Air Defense system has very little 
chance of surviving the first phase of a military conflict, not to 
mention surviving its whole duration, which was proved by the 
few recent ones. These experiences motivate to seek new 
solutions in this field, which would be resistant to the destructive 
effects of the modern combat assets. 
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